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INTRODUCTION

Appraisal as a means to set the amount of loss an insurance
company owes its insured has evolved out of common law as a
result of provisions in early property insurance policies. 1 While
appraisal was treated much like arbitration in early property
insurance cases, 2 arbitration is now governed by statute 3 while
appraisal has been clearly distinguished and is still largely
controlled by common law or with language borrowed from
arbitration statutes. 4 One of the important distinctions between the
1. See generally John R. Casolaro, A Primer on Appraisal to Resolve Valuation
Disputes—Part I, 65 N.Y. ST. B.J., Jan. 1993, at 10, 10 (asserting the common law
roots of appraisals).
2. Early cases in Minnesota applied the same standards to appraisal awards
as they did to arbitration procedures. For an early example of the interpretation of
appraisal clauses in an insurance policy, see Janney, Semple & Co. v. Goehringer,
52 Minn. 428, 430, 54 N.W. 481, 482 (1893). Before the codification of the
Uniform Arbitration Act, Minnesota courts used “arbitrator” and “appraiser”
interchangeably, necessitating a careful read of the facts in each case to determine
whether the holding applies to appraisals or arbitrations. See, e.g., Mork v. EurekaSec. Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 230 Minn. 382, 384, 42 N.W.2d 33, 35 (1950); Bahr v.
Union Fire Ins. Co., 167 Minn. 479, 480, 209 N.W. 490, 490 (1926); McQuaid Mkt.
House Co. v. Home Ins. Co., 147 Minn. 254, 255, 180 N.W. 97, 97 (1920); Produce
Refrigerator Co. v. Norwich Union Fire Ins. Soc’y, 91 Minn. 210, 212, 97 N.W. 875,
875 (1904), aff’d sub nom. Produce Refrigerating Co. v. Norwich Union Fire Ins.
Soc’y, 91 Minn. 210, 98 N.W. 100 (1904).
3. See Uniform Arbitration Act, M INN. STAT. §§ 572B.01–.31 (2012). After
the enactment of the Uniform Arbitration Act in 1952, any contractual arbitration
clause in the state was governed by the statute unless specifically stated otherwise.
6A JAMES REDING, M INNESOTA PRACTICE : M ETHODS OF PRACTICE § 57.1 (3d ed.
2013).
4. See QBE Ins. Corp. v. Twin Homes of French Ridge Homeowners Ass’n,
778 N.W.2d 393, 398 (Minn. Ct. App. 2010) (applying an arbitration statute to
appraisal proceedings). Compare Johnson v. Mut. Serv. Cas. Ins. Co., 732 N.W.2d
340, 346 (Minn. Ct. App. 2007) (“We hold that the statutorily required appraisal
provision is not an agreement to arbitrate governed by the Uniform Arbitration
Act . . . .”), with Cont’l Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Titcomb, 7 F.2d 833, 834 (8th Cir. 1925)
(“[T]he Supreme Court of Minnesota has uniformly held that these proceedings
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two alternative dispute resolution methods is that appraisals are
generally limited to setting the amount of loss owed; appraisals may
not make final determinations as to liability. 5
In Quade v. Secura Insurance, the Minnesota Supreme Court
held that the statutorily mandated appraisal clause in special
property insurance contracts 6 requires appraisers to make
determinations both as to the value and the cause of a loss. 7 As a
part of this decision, the court found that an appraisal is a
condition precedent to litigation—even when a partial denial of
coverage has been made and liability under the policy is in
question. 8 The court’s decision upholds the public policy of
providing efficient, cost-effective alternatives to litigation in
insurance disputes 9 but, under the specific facts of this case,
ironically results in an anti-consumer outcome in an area of law
where public policy strongly favors the consumer because of the
non-negotiable nature of insurance contracts. 10
In analyzing the soundness of the reasoning behind naming
appraisals as a condition precedent to litigation, the roots of the
special fire and wind insurance policy, such as the one owned by
the Quades, is traced back to the seventeenth century. 11 Following a
brief overview of appraisals, statutory interpretation, and the
reasonable consumer expectations doctrine as it applies to
insurance policies, this case note discusses how Minnesota courts
interpreted the appraisal clause of the standard form fire insurance
policy prior to the Quade decision. 12 The rationale of both the
to ascertain the amount of damages under standard policies constitute a commonlaw arbitration . . . .”). Other jurisdictions have held that there is little or no
distinction between arbitration and appraisal. See, e.g., Three Palms Pointe, Inc. v.
State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 250 F. Supp. 2d 1357, 1362 (M.D. Fla. 2003), aff’d,
362 F.3d 1317 (11th Cir. 2004) (stating that appraisal is merely a narrowly
restricted form of arbitration); Covenant Ins. Co. v. Banks, 413 A.2d 862, 866
(Conn. 1979) (rejecting prior case law that distinguished between arbitration and
appraisal); Friday v. Trinity Universal of Kan., 939 P.2d 869, 871 (Kan. 1997)
(“We do not see a meaningful distinction between appraisal and arbitration.”).
5. See infra Part II.B.
6. See M INN. STAT. § 65A.01, subdiv. 3.
7. Quade v. Secura Ins., 814 N.W.2d 703, 708 (Minn. 2012).
8. Id.
9. See generally 15 LEE R. RUSS & THOMAS F. SEGALLA, COUCH ON INSURANCE
§§ 209:1, :4 (3d ed. 2005) (stating that arbitration often expedites proceedings
and provides legal economies for both parties).
10. See infra Part II.A.
11. See infra Part II.A.
12. See infra Part II.B–E.
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majority and the dissenting opinions in the case at hand are also
explored. 13
The analysis of this case note argues that because of the
difference between the legal interpretation of negotiated contracts,
statutes, and insurance policies, the outcome in this case could
have been the same even if the court adopted the insured’s
interpretation of the appraisal clause, but that the court correctly
applied standard mores of contractual interpretation to arrive at its
holding. 14 This case note then discusses the implications of
applying this ruling to future insurance litigation. 15 Finally, this
note concludes that the Minnesota Supreme Court made the
correct decision in ruling that appraisers must necessarily consider
causation in setting the appropriate amount of loss, but to continue
protecting the interests of the less-powerful party in insurance
litigation appraisals should only be a condition precedent to
litigation where coverage has not been totally denied. 16
II. HISTORY OF THE RELEVANT LAW
A. The Origins of Fire Insurance Policies
The Great London Fire of 1666 burned down eighty percent
of the city 17 and ignited a new insurance industry. 18 The removal of
flammable material from the path of the flames as an effective
means of fire control is a concept that is understood by children, 19
and was grasped by human ancestors as early as two million years
ago. 20 Although fire control techniques evolved over the centuries,
13. See infra Part III.
14. See infra Part IV.A–B.
15. See infra Part IV.C–D.
16. See infra Part V.
17. ROY PORTER, LONDON: A SOCIAL HISTORY 87–88 (4th prtg. 2001).
18. Within a few years of the calamitous fire, insurance houses sprung up
throughout the British Isles, and continental Europe followed suit by the
mid-eighteenth century. JOSEPH K. ANGELL , A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF FIRE AND LIFE
INSURANCE 37–39 (2d ed. 1855).
19. See Adver. Council, Inc. et al., Elements of Fire, SMOKEY BEAR,
http://www.smokeybear.com/elements-of-fire.asp (last visited Oct. 11, 2013)
(“[W]hen the fuel is exhausted, removed, or isolated . . . then . . . the fire will
die.”).
20. See Francesco Berna et al., Microstratigraphic Evidence of in Situ Fire in the
Acheulean Strata of Wonderwerk Cave, Northern Cape Province, South Africa, 109 PROC.
NAT’ L ACAD. SCI. U.S. E1215, E1215 (2012), available at http://www.pnas.org
/content/109/20/E1215.full.pdf (theorizing that homo erectus effectively
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a firebreak 21 was the solution to stopping the spread of the Great
London Fire; however, Lord Mayor Thomas Bludworth hesitated to
issue the orders to destroy buildings because he was worried about
how to finance the rebuilding of the houses. 22 Property insurance
became the answer to Mayor Bludworth’s question. 23
By 1755, fire insurance was so affordable that most London
merchants opted to buy policies for their own peace of mind. 24
Meanwhile, with the memory of a catastrophe similar to the Great
London Fire burned into their memories, 25 Benjamin Franklin and
his fellow firefighters founded the first successful fire insurance
company in the colonies. 26
The Philadelphia Contributionship for the Insurance of
Houses from Loss by Fire (“the Contributionship”) was established
in 1752 on a model of mutual insurance, where each member’s
contributions served to insure his peers. 27 It is likely that the articles
of a successful London insurance company, the Amicable
Contributionship for Insuring Houses from Loss by Fire, provided a
basis for Philadelphia’s first plan. 28 The Contributionship
established a minimum guideline for property the company would
insure, 29 and refused to insure houses that were deemed too great a
risk. 30

controlled fire approximately one million years ago in order to cook food).
21. See M ERRIAM WEBSTER’ S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 471 (11th ed. 2003)
(defining firebreak as “a barrier of cleared or plowed land intended to check a
forest or grass fire”).
22. PORTER, supra note 17, at 87.
23. See ANGELL , supra note 18, at 38 (stating that the schemes of an office of
mutual insurance were suggested within a few years of the Great Fire).
24. Id. at 38–39 (“[T]here are few merchants, but choose to be insured for
their own quiet . . . [and] this precaution adds to their credit both at home and
abroad, when it is known that their great capitals lying in their houses and
warehouses are thus secured from the flames.”).
25. In early 1730, a late-night fire burned down all the stores on Fishbourn’s
wharf and several homes in the surrounding area, for a total loss of five thousand
pounds of damage. NICHOLAS B. WAINWRIGHT, A PHILADELPHIA STORY: THE
PHILADELPHIA CONTRIBUTIONSHIP FOR THE INSURANCE OF HOUSES FROM LOSS BY FIRE
17–18 (1952).
26. See Citizen Ben, PUB. BROADCASTING SYS., http://www.pbs.org/benfranklin
/l3_citizen_insurance.html (last visited Sept. 18, 2013). Charleston’s Friendly
Society for the Mutual Insuring of Houses Against Fire failed in 1740, just five
years after its inception. WAINWRIGHT, supra note 25, at 21.
27. Company History, PHILA. CONTRIBUTIONSHIP, http://www.contributionship
.com/history (last visited Sept. 18, 2013).
28. WAINWRIGHT, supra note 25, at 25.
29. Id. at 35–36. Each property insured by the Contributionship was required
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This insurance model was first tested in December of 1753,
when an early-morning fire destroyed the first floor of a home: “the
House being insur’d, the Damage will be immediately repaired,
without Cost to the Owner.” 31 Through the early twentieth century,
the destruction of nearby properties remained the most effective
and generally accepted means of stopping the spread of fires in
cities. 32 Although fire prevention and control techniques have
evolved since 1666, firebreaks are still an effective—if expensive—
means of stopping the spread of fire. 33 Accordingly, fire insurance
has become a booming industry, with a net cost 34 in the United

to have a trap door guarded by iron handrails to the roof for fighting roof and
chimney fires. Id. at 42.
30. Id. When an individual applied for protection under the
Contributionship’s policies, a surveyor inspected the property and prepared a
written report assessing the potential risk. Id. The first surveyors were master
builders, whose expertise was well regarded by the insurance company’s Board. Id.
From the survey reports, the Board determined whether the risk of an individual
property was acceptable, and set rates accordingly. Id. at 38–39.
31. Id. at 47.
32. See WILLIAM BRONSON, THE EARTH SHOOK, THE SKY BURNED:
A PHOTOGRAPHIC RECORD OF THE 1906 SAN FRANCISCO EARTHQUAKE AND FIRE 40
(1959) (crediting the use of dynamite to demolish Van Ness Avenue for stopping
the westward advancement of the fire that followed the 1906 earthquake); Henry
C. Hall & John H. Wigmore, Compensation for Property Destroyed to Stop the Spread of a
Conflagration, 1 U. ILL . L. REV. 501, 501 (1907). The practice of demolishing
private properties to stop the spread of large fires was—and in some jurisdictions
still is—protected as upholding sound public policy. See also OR. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 476.600 (West, Westlaw through 2013 Reg. Sess.) (“Neither the state nor any
county, city or fire district . . . is liable for any injury to person or property
resulting from the performance of any duty imposed by the authority of [the
Oregon Conflagration Act].”); McDonald v. City of Red Wing, 13 Minn. 38, 42
(1868) (stating that the City of Red Wing could not be held liable for damages to a
home torn down to minimize the threat to neighboring properties without an
express statute that imposed responsibility).
33. At the time this note was written, a wildfire in California had burned
more than three hundred square miles and destroyed more than one hundred
structures in eleven days. The fire was only thirty percent contained despite the
expenditure of nearly forty million dollars on firefighting techniques such as aerial
ignitions to burnout fuel in the fire’s path; structure defense; and using remotely
piloted aircraft to monitor the fire’s location, activity, and movements. See Rim Fire
Information Update #19, INCIWEB INCIDENT INFO. SYS. (Aug. 28, 2013),
http://www.inciweb .org/incident/article/3660/21002/.
34. The net cost of insurance is defined as the amount spent in insurance
premiums minus the National Fire Protection Association’s estimated total of
reported damage from fire loss. John R. Hall, Jr., The Total Cost of Fire in the United
States, NAT’ L FIRE PROTECTION ASS’ N 8 (Mar. 2013), http://www.nfpa.org/~/media
/Files/Research/NFPA%20reports/Economic%20impact/ostotalcost.pdf.
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States of $19.2 billion dollars per year. 35 The amount of money that
stokes the fire insurance industry on an annual basis highlights the
public policy reasons that favor alternative dispute resolution over
litigation to reduce costs. Due to the nature of insurance policies,
appraisals are preferable to arbitration because of the imbalance of
resources available to large insurance companies and the lesspowerful consumers. 36
B.

A General Assessment of Appraisal Clauses in Insurance Policies

Appraisals are a non-judicial alternative to resolve insurance
disputes regarding the amount of loss, 37 and are often considered
analogous, but more limited than quasi-judicial arbitration
procedures. 38 Like arbitration, appraisal is meant to discourage
litigation; however, unlike arbitrators, appraisers may only set the
amount of loss—the appraisal process does not displace litigation
for resolving liability disputes. 39 Appraisers apply their own skill and
knowledge to reach their conclusions instead of acting in a quasijudicial capacity. 40
Appraisal provisions have become as important as coverage
and exclusion clauses in resolving disputes where the central issue
35. Id. (based on data collected for 2010).
36. See generally 15 RUSS & SEGALLA, supra note 9, §§ 209:17, 209-29 to -30
(arbitration clauses in adhesion contracts are unfair to the less powerful party).
37. Johnson v. Mut. Serv. Cas. Ins. Co., 732 N.W.2d 340, 342 (Minn. Ct. App.
2007).
38. See Itasca Paper Co. v. Niagara Fire Ins. Co., 175 Minn. 73, 77–78,
220 N.W. 425, 426–27 (1928) (“The duties of the board of appraisal are in the
nature of common-law arbitration.” (citing Am. Cent. Ins. Co. v. Dist. Court,
125 Minn. 374, 147 N.W. 242 (1914))); Johnson, 732 N.W.2d at 342 (“Appraisal is a
non-judicial method to resolve disputes over the amount of a loss.”);
Casolaro, supra note 1, at 10. See generally 15 RUSS & SEGALLA, supra note 9, §§ 209:8,
209-16 to -17 (highlighting similarities and differences between appraisal and
arbitration).
39. Timothy P. Law & Jillian L. Starinovich, What Is It Worth? A Critical
Analysis of Insurance Appraisal, 13 CONN. INS. L.J. 291, 305 (2007). Arbitration
proceedings, on the other hand, are final determinations of the parties’ dispute.
See, e.g., Hoit v. Berger-Crittenden Co., 81 Minn. 356, 358, 84 N.W. 48, 49 (1900)
(“An award of arbitrators must be final and certain, and so determine the matter
submitted that an action between the same parties will not afterwards lie in regard
to it . . . .”); Raymond v. Allied Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 546 N.W.2d 766, 767 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1996) (citing Johnson v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 426 N.W.2d 419, 422
(Minn. 1988)) (regarding finality of arbitrator’s findings of fact).
40. See generally 2 ALLAN D. WINDT, INSURANCE CLAIMS AND DISPUTES § 9:33
(6th ed. 2013), available at Westlaw INCD (distinguishing appraisal requirements
from arbitration procedures).
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is the amount owed. 41 Today, nearly every property insurance policy
contains a standard clause that identifies appraisal as the method
for determining the amount of loss. 42 Special property insurance
policies include this clause due to statutory requirements in many
states, including Minnesota. 43 Because law mandates the wording of
these provisions, 44 there is little variation among appraisal clauses,
but ample variation exists in the way courts have interpreted and
applied these clauses. 45 While most policies include these appraisal
provisions, the insured party’s legal remedies rely on jurisdictional
interpretation to determine whether the appraisal process is
optional or required prior to filing suit. 46
In the context of insurance disputes, courts tend to interpret
ambiguity in favor of coverage rather than evaluating extrinsic
evidence as to the parties’ intent because the terms of insurance
policies are not usually negotiated. 47 In interpreting the appraisal
clause, the Quade court decided the phrase “amount of loss” to be
unambiguous, thereby making the question of interpretation one
of law, and treated the resulting analysis as an exercise in statutory
interpretation rather than a fact-finding inquiry into the intent of
the parties. 48

41. Johnny C. Parker, Understanding the Insurance Policy Appraisal Clause:
A Four-Step Program, 37 U. TOL . L. REV. 931, 931 (2006).
42. 5 RICHARD J. COHEN ET AL ., APPLEMAN ON INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE
§ 47.06(2) (2013), available at LEXIS NEWAPL; Law & Starinovich, supra note 39,
at 292–93.
43. See, e.g., M ICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 500.2833 (West, Westlaw through 2013
Reg. Sess.) (mandating that all fire insurance policies contain an appraisal clause
as worded in the statute); M INN. STAT. § 65A.01 (2012) (providing a standard form
for fire insurance policies that include an appraisal clause).
44. See, e.g., M INN. STAT. § 65A.01 (standard form fire policy).
45. See Kristin Suga Heres et al., Appraisal Fundamentals in Modern Property
Insurance Practice, TIPS PROP. INS. L. COMMITTEE NEWSL . (Am. Bar Ass’n, Chi., Ill.),
Fall 2011, at 22–23, available at http://www.zelle.com/assets/attachments/TIPS
%20Property%20Insurance%20Law%20Committee%20Newsletter.pdf.
46. 2 RICHARD C. BENNET, INSURING REAL PROPERTY § 30.01(1) (2013),
available at LEXIS.
47. See Randall H. Warner, All Mixed Up About Contract: When Is Contract
Interpretation a Legal Question and When Is It a Fact Question?, 5 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 81,
111 (2010).
48. See Quade v. Secura Ins., 814 N.W.2d 703, 704 (Minn. 2012); see also supra
Part II.A–B.
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A Synopsis of Statutory Interpretation

Statutes and contracts require interpretation because they are
composed of words, which achieve at best only an approximate
precision of the meaning imparted by the drafters. 49
The text of a statute is a medium of communication.
Its function is to communicate the will of society,
articulated by the legislature as society’s agent for that
purpose, to society’s members, telling them how they
should or should not behave or what consequences
should or might attach to certain actions or events. 50
Due to both the imprecise nature of words and the gargantuan task
of expressing society’s will, the legislative process may result in laws
with either purposeful or accidental imprecision that require
further interpretation. 51
Accordingly, and by Minnesota law, “[t]he object of all
interpretation and construction of laws is to ascertain and
effectuate the intention of the legislature.” 52 However, when the
wording of a statute is unambiguous, the legislature has decreed
that “the letter of the law shall not be disregarded under the
pretext of pursuing the spirit.” 53 This means that while the words in
a statute may be vague in some places and require courts to
consider what the legislature meant to accomplish, where the text
of a statute is clear courts may not read other meaning into the
law. 54
The first question of statutory interpretation is whether the
plain language of the law is ambiguous. 55 Ambiguity is only deemed
49. See Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM.
L. REV. 527, 529 (1947).
50. 2A NORMAN J. SINGER & J.D. SHAMBIE SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION § 45:1, at 5 (7th ed. 2007).
51. See Frankfurter, supra note 49, at 528 (“The prohibition contained in the
Fifth Amendment refers to infamous crimes—a term obviously inviting
interpretation in harmony with conditions and opinions prevailing from time to
time.” (quoting United States v. Moreland, 258 U.S. 433, 451 (1922), as an
example of purposeful ambiguity in the drafting of statutes)).
52. M INN. STAT. § 645.16 (2012).
53. Id.
54. See Adzick v. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am., 351 F.3d 883, 887 (8th Cir.
2003) (applying Minnesota law) (“[C]ourt[s] must fastidiously guard against any
invitation to ‘create ambiguities’ where there are none.”); State v. Loge,
608 N.W.2d 152, 155 (Minn. 2000) (citing M INN. STAT. § 645.16).
55. See State v. Peck, 773 N.W.2d 768, 772 (Minn. 2009) (“The threshold
issue in any statutory interpretation analysis is whether the statute’s language is
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to exist where the language in the statute is open to more than one
reasonable interpretation. 56 In addition to applying the
aforementioned standard methods of contract interpretation,
courts must interpret statutes in accordance with the intention of
the legislature. 57 Where the letter of the law is not definitive, courts
should consider
(1) The occasion and necessity for the law;
(2) The circumstances under which it was enacted;
(3) The mischief to be remedied;
(4) The object to be attained;
(5) The former law, if any, including other laws upon the
same or similar subjects;
(6) The consequences of a particular interpretation;
(7) The contemporaneous legislative history; and
(8) Legislative and administrative interpretations of the
statute. 58
Insurance policies occupy a unique space in the realm of
judicial interpretation. 59 Courts tend to interpret clauses in
insurance policies much the same way as they interpret statutes;
instead of looking to the evidence about what the parties intended,
judges look to the plain meaning of the language and the context
and purpose of the clause. 60 The question of ambiguity is a prime
example of how insurance policies are treated differently from
negotiated contracts, 61 and will be discussed in more detail in Part
IV. 62

ambiguous.” (citing State v. Wiltgen, 737 N.W.2d 561, 570–71 (Minn. 2007))).
56. State v. Mauer, 741 N.W.2d 107, 111 (Minn. 2007) (citing State v.
Stevenson, 656 N.W.2d 235, 238 (Minn. 2003)).
57. M INN. STAT. § 645.16.
58. Id.; see also Vaidyanathan v. Seagate U.S. L.L.C., 691 F.3d 972, 977
(8th Cir. 2012) (citing Brayton v. Pawlenty, 781 N.W.2d 357, 363 (Minn. 2010)).
59. See generally Warner, supra note 47, at 106–09 (offering examples of
“traditional” contracts and contrasting these with cases requiring the
interpretation of insurance policies).
60. Id. at 110–11.
61. Id. at 111.
62. See infra Part IV.A.
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D. Reasonable Consumer Expectations and Insurance Policies in
Minnesota
The doctrine of reasonable consumer expectations as applied
to insurance policies has its roots in the interpretation of
ambiguous provisions, 63 and illustrates another way in which
insurance policies are treated differently than negotiated contracts.
The idea behind the rule is similar to that of contra proferentem 64—
that the drafter of a policy should bear the risk of writing
ambiguous terms. 65 Contrary to standard contract interpretation
rules, however, the doctrine of reasonable consumer expectations
maintains that even where a standard term may appear
unambiguous, the objectively reasonable expectations of the
insured party should be honored. 66
In Atwater Creamery Co. v. Western National Mutual Insurance Co.,
Minnesota formally adopted the reasonable expectations doctrine
when it applied the rule to exclusions hidden in the definitions
section of insurance policies—thereby holding the insured only to
a “reasonable knowledge of the literal terms and conditions” even
where a close examination of the policy would have negated those
expectations. 67 The doctrine does not automatically result in the
adoption of the insured’s understanding of the policy—the
question of reasonability must also be considered under the

63. See Mark C. Rahdert, Reasonable Expectations Revisited, 5 CONN. INS. L.J.
107, 115 (1998) (“[T]he seed of the reasonable expectations doctrine first
germinated in the time-honored ambiguity principle of insurance policy
interpretation.”).
64. See 22 BRITTON D. WEIMER ET AL ., M INNESOTA PRACTICE : INSURANCE LAW
AND PRACTICE § 2.3 (2d ed. 2012) (“[C]ontra proferentem . . . means that an
ambiguous contract, especially an adhesion contract, is construed against the
drafter.”).
65. See Rahdert, supra note 63, at 115–16.
66. For a thorough discussion of reasonable consumer expectations, see
Robert E. Keeton, Insurance Law Rights at Variance with Policy Provisions, 83 HARV. L.
REV. 961, 966–75 (1970); see also Rahdert, supra note 63, at 115–16 (“[W]hen a
policy term is ambiguous, the court should adopt the interpretation that favors the
insured.”).
67. Atwater Creamery Co. v. W. Nat’l Mut. Ins. Co., 366 N.W.2d 271, 278
(Minn. 1985) (emphasis added). Contra Piper Jaffray Co. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins.
Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa., 967 F. Supp. 1148, 1154 (D. Minn. 1997) (“Minnesota
courts have been quite clear that the initial existence of a contractual ambiguity
does not ‘ineluctably lead to the conclusion that the drafter is to lose.’” (quoting
Davis ex rel. Davis v. Outboard Marine Corp., 415 N.W.2d 719, 724 (Minn. Ct. App.
1987))).
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specific facts of the situation. 68 Not all plausible ambiguities are
construed in the insured’s favor. 69 The doctrine takes the following
into consideration: “1. [the] unequal bargaining power between
the parties; 2. the lay person’s inability to read and understand an
insurance policy; [and] 3. [that] the insured relies on the agent or
company to provide the appropriate coverage.” 70 As will be shown
below, in this case the reasonable expectations of the Quades did
not overcome the statutory interpretation of the standard form fire
insurance policy. 71
E.

Minnesota Interprets the Statutory Fire Insurance Appraisal Clause

Property insurance policies have included appraisal clauses for
well over a century. 72 In 1893, the Minnesota courts treated
appraisals much like arbitration procedures, and allowed appraisers
to make coverage determinations as to the application of the
insurance policy. 73 In 1895, the legislature enacted the Minnesota
Standard Fire Insurance Policy, which provided a standard form
complete with requisite terms and conditions for fire insurance
policies. 74 This standardization also prevented insurers from
crafting provisions designed to take unfair advantage of their
policyholders—a problem inherent in insurance contracts at the
time. 75

68. See Atwater Creamery, 366 N.W.2d at 278 (stating that the reasonable
expectations doctrine does not excuse an insured from reading the policy); see also
Hubred v. Control Data Corp., 442 N.W.2d 308, 311 (Minn. 1989) (“In short, the
doctrine asks whether the insured’s expectation of coverage is reasonable given all
the facts and circumstances.”).
69. See Tomlyanovich v. Tomlyanovich, 239 Minn. 250, 265–66, 58 N.W.2d
855, 864 (1953) (holding that insured’s interpretation of an ambiguous term
contradicted the intent of the policy).
70. Grinnell Mut. Reinsurance Co. v. Wasmuth, 432 N.W.2d 495, 499
(Minn. Ct. App. 1988), overruled on other grounds by Bd. of Regents v. Royal Ins. Co.
of Am., 517 N.W.2d 888 (Minn. 1994) (citing Atwater Creamery, 366 N.W.2d at 277).
71. See infra Part IV.A.
72. See Janney, Semple & Co. v. Goehringer, 52 Minn. 428, 430, 54 N.W. 481,
481–82 (1893) (providing an example of early disputes over the appraisal process
in a Minnesota insurance policy); see also Scottish Union & Nat’l Ins. Co. v. Clancy,
8 S.W. 630, 631 (Tex. 1888) (interpreting a similar provision under Texas law).
73. See Goehringer, 52 Minn. at 432, 54 N.W. at 482 (holding that an appraisal
completed without a hearing was invalid).
74. See Act approved Apr. 25, 1895, ch. 175, § 53, 1895 Minn. Laws 392, 418
(codified as amended at M INN. STAT. § 65A.01, subdiv. 3 (2012)).
75. See Dworsky v. Vermes Credit Jewelry, Inc., 244 Minn. 62, 65, 69 N.W.2d
118, 121 (1955) (“The plain intent of the legislature was to nullify offending
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The original statute required only that appraisers be three
disinterested men chosen by the parties. 76 The amount of loss
agreed upon by these individuals was considered binding. 77 In 1913
the legislature amended this provision to state that these
disinterested men be “competent, disinterested, and impartial.” 78
This change did not affect the provision that the appraisers’
determination of the award was considered binding. 79 The
Minnesota Supreme Court interpreted the updated appraisal
clause of the standard fire insurance policy as confining appraisers’
determinations of causation to include whether the damage
resulted from causes covered by the policy or from non-covered
causes. 80
Today the standard form includes an appraisal clause that
states:
In case the insured and [the insurance] company . . .
shall fail to agree as to the actual cash value or the amount
of loss, then, on the written demand of either, each shall
select a competent and disinterested appraiser and notify the
other of the appraiser selected within 20 days of such
demand. . . . The appraisers shall then appraise the loss,
stating separately actual value and loss to each item; and,
failing to agree, shall submit their differences, only, to the
umpire. An award in writing, so itemized, of any two when
filed with this company shall determine the amount of
actual value and loss. 81
With this clause, the statute set a consistent appraisal process to
support the public policy of ensuring “a plain, speedy, inexpensive
and just determination of the extent of the loss.” 82 In addition to
the standard fire insurance policy, this appraisal clause has also

provisions favoring the insurer . . . .”).
76. Act approved Apr. 25, 1895, 1895 Minn. Laws at 421 (“[I]t is mutually
agreed that the amount of such loss shall be referred to three disinterested men
the company and the insured each choosing one out of three persons . . . and the
third being selected by the two so chosen . . . .”).
77. Id.
78. Act approved Apr. 22, 1913, ch. 421, § 1, 1913 Minn. Laws 619, 619.
79. See id.
80. Am. Cent. Ins. Co. v. Dist. Court, 125 Minn. 374, 378, 147 N.W. 242, 244
(1914).
81. M INN. STAT. § 65A.01, subdiv. 3 (2012) (emphasis added). A similar
clause is also included in M INN. STAT. § 65A.26 (hail insurance).
82. Kavli v. Eagle Star Ins. Co., 206 Minn. 360, 364, 288 N.W. 723, 725
(1939).
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been statutorily mandated in other special property insurance
policies in Minnesota. 83
The legislature’s intention was that appraisals would “provide
for the ascertainment of loss, not liability.” 84 Despite allowing
appraisers to consider causative factors to determine the value of a
loss, Minnesota courts generally agree that appraisers are not
allowed to construe the meaning or the extent of coverage
provided by an insurance policy. 85 Questions regarding liability
have traditionally been reserved for the courts. 86 However, the
distinction between questions of liability and the value of a loss are
not always easily drawn—a common cause of confusion between
valuation and liability claims is when an insurer pays only part of a
claimed loss and disputes the remainder. 87 The disagreement
between the majority and the dissent in Quade is summarized in the
next section, and highlights the public policy considerations the
court has upheld in interpreting the standard form property
insurance policy. 88
III. THE Q UADE DECISION
A. The Calm Before the Storm
David and Melinda Quade owned a special farmowners
protector policy through Secura Insurance for direct physical
property loss caused by fire and wind. 89 The policy expressly
83. See M INN. STAT. § 65A.26 (providing similar requirement without the
standard form for hail insurance policies).
84. Glidden Co. v. Retail Hardware Mut. Fire Ins. Co. of Minn., 181 Minn.
518, 523, 233 N.W. 310, 312 (1930), aff’d sub nom. Hardware Dealers’ Mut. Fire Ins.
Co. of Wis. v. Glidden Co., 284 U.S. 151 (1931), overruled on other grounds by Park
Constr. Co. v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 32, 209 Minn. 182, 296 N.W. 475 (1941)
(noting that a general agreement to arbitrate all differences to arise under a
contract is contrary to public policy and therefore void).
85. See, e.g., Mork v. Eureka-Sec. Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 230 Minn. 382, 384,
42 N.W.2d 33, 35 (1950) (stating that a board of arbitrators’ decision that a loss
was not covered by the insurance policy was not final); see also Itasca Paper Co. v.
Niagara Fire Ins. Co., 175 Minn. 73, 78–79, 220 N.W. 425, 427 (1928);
Johnson v. Mut. Serv. Cas. Ins. Co., 732 N.W.2d 340, 346 (Minn. Ct. App. 2007).
86. See, e.g., Mork, 230 Minn. at 384, 42 N.W.2d at 35 (explaining that the
arbitrators’ findings regarding liability were surplus and outside the arbitrators’
province); Itasca Paper, 175 Minn. at 78, 220 N.W. at 427 (stating that appraisers’
findings of law and fact are conclusive, but findings of liability are not).
87. See Law & Starinovich, supra note 39, at 309.
88. See Quade v. Secura Ins., 814 N.W.2d 703, 706–07 (Minn. 2012).
89. Id. at 704.
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excluded damages resulting from deficient maintenance. 90 Per
statutory requirements, the policy also included a provision stating
that if “the insured and this company . . . shall fail to agree as to the
actual cash value or the amount of loss,” either party could initiate
the appraisal process. 91 This phrase became a point of contention
after a windstorm blew through the Quades’ property, leaving
significant destruction in its wake. 92
On July 10, 2008, a summer storm damaged several buildings
and other property on David and Melinda Quade’s farm in
Hastings, Minnesota and surrounding properties. 93 On the Quades’
property alone, in addition to the contested damage to the roofs of
three barns, two structures were pushed off their bases; loaded
semi-trailers were overturned, damaging the property within; and
sections were torn from several buildings. 94 The Quades submitted
a single claim for all of the property losses sustained during the
storm to Secura Insurance. 95 Secura paid for some of the damages,
but determined that the damage to the roofs of a warehouse, horse
barn, and cow barn resulted from inadequate maintenance rather
than the July windstorm and were therefore exempt based on the
exclusion for inadequate maintenance. 96 The Secura letter also
advised that if the Quades did not agree with the company’s
determination that the roof damage was not caused by the storm,
they should initiate the appraisal process as defined in the policy. 97

90. Id.
91. See M INN. STAT. § 65A.01, subdiv. 3 (2012) (emphasis added).
92. See Quade, 814 N.W.2d at 705.
93. Respondents’ Brief, Addendum and Appendix at 2–3, Quade, 814 N.W.2d
703 (No. A10-714), 2011 WL 8190755.
94. Id.
95. Quade, 814 N.W.2d at 704.
96. Id. In a letter dated May 11, 2009, Secura told the Quades:
At our request we had an engineer inspect the buildings and offer
his opinion as to the cause of the roof leakage. Based on his verbal
conclusions it’s our understanding that the grommets that seal
between the nail head and the roof metal have deteriorated over
time. . . . This is the result of continual deterioration over a period of
time rather than a specific storm occurrence. Your farm policy
excludes “loss to property caused by any of the following . . . (4)
Maintenance.”
Respondent’s Brief and Appendix at 6, Quade v. Secura Ins., 792 N.W.2d 478
(Minn. Ct. App. 2011) (No. A10-714) (second alteration in original), 2010 WL
5861455.
97. Quade, 814 N.W.2d at 704–05.
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The Quades’ Complaint to the Court—Procedural Posture

Rather than pursuing an appraisal, as Secura advised after it
denied this portion of the claim, the Quades initiated an action for
breach of contract. 98 Secura moved for summary judgment because
the Quades did not invoke the appraisal clause. 99 The Quades
argued for a narrow interpretation of “amount of loss,” as they
would then not be required to go through the appraisal process
prior to pursuing court proceedings. 100 This interpretation would
deny appraisers the power to determine the cause of a loss when
evaluating its value, thereby limiting the appraisal process to
determining the value of the loss only. 101 Secura countered that this
interpretation would confuse “amount of loss” with the question of
liability under the policy. 102 According to Secura, liability questions
apply to whether an event is covered under the policy, and
“amount of loss” relates to the damage caused by a covered event.103
The Dakota County District Court ruled in Secura’s favor,
stating that the Quades’ suggested interpretation of the “amount of
loss” provision confused the valuation of a loss and the question of
liability under a policy. 104 According to the district court, whether
the roofs were damaged by the storm or some other cause was an
appropriate question for the appraisal process, and whether the
damage was excluded due to events other than the storm would be
a legal question for the court at a later date. 105 The court therefore
granted summary judgment for Secura. 106 The decision included an
order for the parties to participate in the appraisal process, but
noted that the appraisal findings would not preclude either party
from bringing a declaratory judgment action on a coverage issue. 107
The court of appeals reversed the summary judgment on the
grounds that a legal question—the applicability of the exclusion
clause—was in controversy. 108 Noting that questions of fact (the
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
2572491
105.
106.
107.
108.

Id. at 705.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 705–06.
Id. at 706.
Quade v. Secura Ins., No. 19HA-CV-09-5534, slip op. at 4, 2010 WL
(Minn. Dist. Ct. Feb. 22, 2010).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Quade v. Secura Ins., 792 N.W.2d 478, 483 (Minn. Ct. App. 2011), rev’d,
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effects of the storm versus the effects of inadequate maintenance)
were entangled with law (the meaning of the contract, the interplay
of coverage and exclusions, and causation), the court stated that
the legal questions would not be resolved by an appraisal
proceeding. 109 The court reversed the judgment and remanded the
case. 110
In the appeal before the Minnesota Supreme Court, the main
point of contention between the parties was again characterized as
differing interpretations of the “amount of loss” phrase in the
appraisal clause. 111 After careful consideration, the Minnesota
Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals’ decision, holding
that “amount of loss” unambiguously requires an appraiser’s
assessment to include a determination of causation. 112 The court
also noted that such a determination would not be final as to
liability under the policy. 113
C.

Rationale of the Minnesota Supreme Court’s Majority Opinion

The majority opinion agreed appraisers “may not construe the
policy or decide whether the insurer should pay,” 114 which is in
accordance with the historical interpretation of the appraisal
clause. 115 However, the court reasoned that the legal definitions of
loss 116 in the context of insurance contracts refer to the damages for
which the insurer is responsible. 117 When the standard legal definition
was applied, there was only one reasonable interpretation of the
phrase possible in the context of the policy. 118 By definition, an

814 N.W.2d 703 (Minn. 2012).
109. Id. at 482.
110. Id. at 483.
111. Quade v. Secura Ins., 814 N.W.2d 703, 705 (Minn. 2012).
112. Id. at 708.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 706.
115. See supra Part II.B.
116. Quade, 814 N.W.2d at 706 (citing BLACK’ S LAW DICTIONARY 1030 (9th ed.
2009) (defining insurance loss as “[t]he amount of financial detriment caused
by . . . an insured property’s damage, for which the insurer becomes liable”) and
M ERRIAM–WEBSTER’ S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 687 (10th ed. 2001) (defining “loss”
in the insurance context as “the amount of an insured’s financial detriment by
death or damage that the insurer becomes liable for”)).
117. Id.
118. Id.
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appraiser must necessarily consider causation in order to set the
amount of loss. 119
Despite granting appraisers the ability to decide causation, the
court reserved the judicial power to make final coverage
determinations where an appraisal incorrectly addresses questions
of liability. 120 According to the court, the finality of appraisal
findings of causation would depend on: (1) the nature of the
damage, (2) the possible causes, (3) the parties’ dispute, and
(4) the structure of the appraisal award. 121 This reserves a broad
interpretation of the events leading to a lawsuit for the courts and
characterizes an important distinction between appraisals and
arbitration. 122
The court further stated that adopting the Quades’ view would
circumvent the public policy reasons that benefit the consumer in
providing efficient and cost-effective alternatives to litigation that
have led to the rise of appraisal as the preferred method of
resolving disputes over coverage amounts. 123 The supreme court’s
final decision names appraisal as a condition precedent to filing
suit in property insurance claims whenever questions regarding the
amount of damages exist—including when questions regarding
liability exist. 124 Although the majority upheld the public policy
promoting appraisals as the preferred method of dispute
resolution, improper application of the opinion could contradict
the public policy that favors the consumer in insurance disputes.
D. The Dissent Cautions Against Broad Application
Justice Page’s dissenting opinion rejects the majority’s ruling
on the grounds that the Quade dispute was not over the amount of
loss, but over Secura’s liability under the policy. 125 Where there is
no dispute over the amount of loss there is no need for an
appraisal per the statutory language. 126 Justice Page argued that the
119. Id.
120. Id. at 707–08.
121. Id.
122. See supra Part II.B.
123. Quade, 814 N.W.2d at 707 (“Adopting the Quades’ interpretation would
render appraisal clauses inoperative in most situations, and that result is in direct
conflict with the public policy behind the appraisal process and the fact that we
have repeatedly encouraged its use in Minnesota.”).
124. See id. at 708.
125. Id. (Page, J., dissenting).
126. Id. at 709.
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majority sidestepped the issue of coverage under the policy by
focusing on the “amount of loss” phrasing. 127
The dissent argued that litigation would be required in
addition to the expense of the appraisal, because even a completed
appraisal would not resolve the parties’ conflict. 128 According to
Justice Page, under the present circumstances Secura should not
have been allowed to demand an appraisal because
(1) the insurance company did not dispute the amount of loss, and
(2) judicial economy would benefit from answering the question of
coverage first. 129 The dissent also warns that the majority decision—
despite its assertion to the contrary—would allow an appraiser’s
determination of causation to be final, 130 which is in direct conflict
with the established case law. 131
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Ambiguity – A Prime Example of the Difference Between Interpreting
Insurance Policies and Negotiated Contracts
1. After Arriving at Ambiguity
The general use of the English language may properly be
decided by a judge as a matter of law instead of as a matter of fact
based on extrinsic evidence by a jury. 132 In fact, an evaluation of the
language of a contract in the context of the written document is
the first step in deciding whether an ambiguity exists. 133 However, as
illustrated below, once a word or phrase has been determined
ambiguous, insurance policies are treated differently than
negotiated contracts.
127. Id. at 708.
128. Id. at 709.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 708–09.
131. See supra Part II.E.
132. See EEP Workers’ Comp. Fund v. Fun & Sun, Inc., 794 N.W.2d 126, 131
(Minn. Ct. App. 2011) (“The construction and effect of a contract are questions of
law for the court, but where there is ambiguity and construction depends upon
extrinsic evidence and a writing, there is a question of fact for the jury.” (quoting
Turner v. Alpha Phi Sorority House, 276 N.W.2d 63, 66 (Minn. 1979)));
see also Columbia Heights Motors, Inc. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 275 N.W.2d 32, 34
(Minn. 1979); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 212 cmt. d, at 127 (1981).
133. See Christensen v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 542 F. Supp. 2d 935, 940
(D. Minn. 2008) (“[I]f the policy is, by its language alone, susceptible to more than
one reasonable interpretation, it is ambiguous.” (emphasis added)).
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Under standard contract interpretation principles, the
meaning of the agreement is to be determined by the fact-finder if
the meaning depends on the credibility of extrinsic evidence or on
a choice among reasonable inferences drawn from the evidence. 134
The first task in evaluating a perceived ambiguity is to examine the
meaning of the contested phrase within the four corners of the
document itself. 135 As discussed in the previous section, the Quade
decision followed this approach on the grounds that insurance
policies are evaluated under general principles of contract
interpretation unless statutory law objects. 136 However, the question
of ambiguity presents a three-way fork in the road for the
interpretation of negotiated contracts, insurance policies, and
statutes.
Once all of the permitted evidence 137 is laid bare, the question
over the true meaning of an ambiguous statement is typically for a
jury to decide. 138 On the other hand, where there is a dispute over
the meaning of a clause in an insurance policy, courts often resolve
ambiguity themselves by looking into the language of the policy
itself. 139 For statutory interpretation, legislative intent is the
134. Id. at 941 (quoting Lewis v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc’y of the U.S.,
389 N.W.2d 876, 884 (Minn. 1986)); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
§ 212(1), at 125 (1981).
135. See Christensen, 542 F. Supp. 2d at 941 (citing In re Hennepin Cnty. 1986
Recycling Bond Litig., 540 N.W.2d 494, 498 (Minn. 1995)) (stating that courts do
not consider extrinsic evidence when deciding whether a provision is ambiguous).
136. See Quade v. Secura Ins., 814 N.W.2d 703, 705 (Minn. 2012). A more
thorough analysis of the court’s reasoning is provided in supra Part IV.B.
137. Some evidence may be excluded if the written agreement is found to be
unambiguous. See, e.g., Lehman v. Stout, 261 Minn. 384, 389, 112 N.W.2d 640, 644
(1961) (prior agreements); Fid. State Bank v. Bradley, 227 Minn. 541, 543,
35 N.W.2d 748, 750 (1949) (contemporaneous oral agreements); Mrozik Constr.,
Inc. v. Lovering Assocs., Inc., 461 N.W.2d 49, 49 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990) (excluding
parol evidence). Judicial approaches in the application of the parol evidence rule
vary. See generally Stephen F. Ross & Daniel Tranen, The Modern Parol Evidence Rule
and Its Implications for New Textualist Statutory Interpretation, 87 GEO. L.J. 195,
199–208 (1998) (highlighting the differences between Williston’s (formalist) and
Corbin’s (liberal) approaches to the admissibility of parol evidence).
138. See Noreen v. Park Constr. Co., 255 Minn. 187, 191, 96 N.W.2d 33, 36
(1959) (stating that where the contract was open to three interpretations and
conflicting evidence was presented as to intent of the parties, the proper
interpretation of the ambiguity was a question for jury’s determination);
see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 212(2), at 125 (1981).
139. See, e.g., Nathe Bros. v. Am. Nat. Fire Ins. Co., 615 N.W.2d 341, 344
(Minn. 2000) (stating that the interpretation of insurance policies presents a
question of law); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 212 cmt. d, at 127
(1981) (“In cases of standardized contracts such as insurance policies, [having
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controlling factor. 140 The Quade court began its analysis with the
assertion that insurance policies should be interpreted under
standard contract interpretation principles, 141 but then only briefly
mentioned the parties’ specific circumstances in establishing
“amount of loss” as unambiguous; 142 the bulk of the court’s
reasoning concerned the historical scope of appraisal clauses in
insurance contracts. 143 The court could also have found “amount of
loss” to be ambiguous and arrived at the same conclusion by
applying the rules of statutory interpretation as set out below.
2. Statutory Intent Trumps Reasonable Consumer Expectations
In this case, the court found “amount of loss” unambiguous,
but under the theory of reasonable consumer expectations
discussed in Part II, 144 it appears the Quades could have prevailed in
their understanding that appraisers were not allowed to determine
the cause of the damage to their roofs. Combining Minnesota’s
generally prevailing law that questions of liability are a decision for
juries and the pro-insured attitude of policy interpretation, 145 it is
reasonable for the Quades to have understood that appraisers were
not allowed to determine the cause of damage. However, the policy
in question was one mandated by the Standard Fire Insurance
Policy—not a company-specific standard form drafted by Secura—
and should have been analyzed for the intent of the legislature in
drafting the form, not the intent of the bargaining parties.
While the court focused its attention on finding the language
unambiguous, it is important to note that the outcome in this case
could have been the same even if the phrase was held to be
ambiguous. The next step of the process would have been
interpreting the statute, and the contra-insurer rule does not apply
to passages mandated by statute. 146 As previously stated, the intent
courts decide what meaning to attach to words] provides a method of assuring that
like cases will be decided alike.”); Warner, supra note 47, at 111.
140. M INN. STAT. § 645.16 (2012). A brief analysis of how Minnesota courts
determine legislative intent is provided supra Part IV.A. For a policy argument
cautioning against the strict four-corners interpretation of statutes, see Ross &
Tranen, supra note 137, at 195–242.
141. Quade, 814 N.W.2d at 705.
142. See id.
143. See id. at 707–09.
144. See supra Part II.D.
145. See supra Parts II.A, D.
146. Interpretation of statutorily mandated coverage is “strictly or broadly
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of the legislature—acting on behalf of society at large—is a
controlling factor in the interpretation of enacted laws. 147
The Minnesota Legislature intended to enforce standard terms
and procedures when it enacted the standard form policy for fire
insurance. 148 Insurance policies “must be consistent with both the
letter and the spirit of the statute.” 149 Since public policy strongly
favors arbitration for insurance disputes, 150 the court’s finding that
appraisals are a condition precedent to litigation is in accordance
with the legislature’s intent. However, this presents a paradox: the
appraisal clause was enacted with the goal of reducing judicial
workload, when the prevailing policy in insurance litigation is to
protect the interests of the insured.151 In this case, where protecting
the Quades’ interests would require additional workload without
the appraisal process, the paradox does provide the correct
solution; the will of society as a whole embodied by the statute 152
should take precedence over the needs of a few individual
litigants, 153 but this ruling should not be used to contradict the
pattern of pro-insured partiality established in Minnesota.
B.

Appraisers Correctly Allowed to Consider Causation in Assessing
“Amount of Loss”

In order to declare appraisal a condition precedent to
litigation under standard means of contract interpretation, the
court first had to find the phrase “amount of loss” to be
unambiguous to avoid applying the contra-insurer rule. 154 Because
construed” depending on the statute’s construction principles. WEIMER ET AL .,
supra note 64, § 2:3.
147. See supra Part II.C.
148. See Wild Rice Lumber Co. v. Royal Ins. Co., 99 Minn. 190, 194, 108 N.W.
871, 872 (1906).
149. WEIMER ET AL ., supra note 64, § 2:6.
150. See Park Constr. Co. v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 32, 209 Minn. 182, 186,
296 N.W. 475, 477 (1941).
151. For a summary of exceptions to the public policy considerations that
favor insured parties in Minnesota, see WEIMER ET AL ., supra note 64, § 2:6.
152. See supra Part II.C.
153. See SPOCK, STAR TREK II: THE WRATH OF KHAN (Paramount Pictures 1982)
(“[L]ogic clearly dictates that the needs of the many outweigh the needs of the
few.”). But see Roger J. Marzulla, Opening Remarks, 46 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 781,
784–85 (2006) (arguing that the United States government is grounded in the
principle that the rights of the individual trump the notion of greater public good
and therefore individuals should not be made to unnecessarily give up their rights
for the good of the public at large).
154. See supra Part II.D.
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insurance contracts are adhesion contracts, 155 any reasonable doubt
or ambiguity must usually be resolved in favor of the insured. 156
The supreme court followed appropriate standards of contract and
statutory interpretation in deciding against ambiguity.
Whether policy language is ambiguous is a question for the
court. 157 The interpretation of insurance contracts has a
tempestuous history in Minnesota common law—methods of
finding and interpreting ambiguity range from the strict
application of contra preferendem 158 and the doctrine of reasonable
consumer expectations to hybrid approaches. 159 In the wake of this
murky history, Minnesota has established partiality in favor of
insureds, 160 leading one to believe that the majority should have
decided in favor of the Quades’ interpretation. The Quade decision
avoided this potential problem by finding that the phrase “amount
of loss” in the appraisal clause lacked the requisite ambiguity to
trigger the contra-insurer rule. 161
Standard rules of contract interpretation state that “[a] writing
is interpreted as a whole.” 162 Ambiguity only exists where terms are

155. See Samuelson v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 446 N.W.2d 428, 431
(Minn. Ct. App. 1989); see also BLACK’ S LAW DICTIONARY 342 (9th ed. 2009)
(defining adhesion contract as “[a] standard-form contract prepared by one party,
to be signed by another party in a weaker position, usu[ally] a consumer, who
adheres to the contract with little choice about the terms”).
156. See Cement, Sand & Gravel Co. v. Agric. Ins. Co. of Watertown, N.Y.,
225 Minn. 211, 215, 30 N.W.2d 341, 345 (1947) (citing De Graff v. Queen Ins. Co.,
38 Minn. 501, 503, 38 N.W. 696, 697 (1888)).
157. Columbia Heights Motors, Inc. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 275 N.W.2d 32, 34
(Minn. 1979).
158. A party drafting an agreement is likely to consider his own benefit and is
more likely “to have reason to know of uncertainties of meaning.” RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 206 cmt. a (1981). Interpretation against the drafter “is
often invoked in cases of standardized contracts and in cases where the drafting
party has the stronger bargaining position.” Id.
159. For a discussion of the trend of interpretation methods used to
determine ambiguous terms in insurance contracts in Minnesota, see Scott Cody,
Case Note, Contracts: An Ambiguous Standard for Resolving Ambiguity in Insurance
Contracts: The Continuing Uncertainty of Policy Interpretation in Minnesota—Carlson v.
Allstate Insurance Co., 36 WM. M ITCHELL L. REV. 266, 268–88 (2009).
160. See St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. Dahlberg, Inc., 596 N.W.2d 674, 677
(Minn. Ct. App. 1999); see also Hennen v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 312 Minn. 131,
136, 250 N.W.2d 840, 844 (1977) (stating Minnesota’s preference for extending
coverage rather than allowing restrictions for confusing or ambiguous policy
language), modified, U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Fruchtman, 263 N.W.2d 66 (Minn.
1978).
161. Quade v. Secura Ins., 814 N.W.2d 703, 706 (Minn. 2012).
162. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 202(2), at 86 (1981); see also Art
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subject to more than one reasonable interpretation. 163
Determinations of meaning or ambiguity should only be made
based on the specific circumstances surrounding the parties. 164
However, where language has a “generally prevailing” meaning, it is
interpreted in accordance with that meaning.165 Additionally, words
of art are given their technical meaning when used in a transaction
within their technical field. 166 Because “amount of loss” is an
undefined term in the standard fire policy, the Quade court applied
the term’s generally prevailing meaning, 167 thereby finding the
term unambiguous. 168 By this line of reasoning, the court correctly
found the phrase “amount of loss” allows appraisers to consider
causative factors when the phrase is used within the field of
insurance appraisals.
C.

Cautioning Against the Finality of Appraisal Findings
1. Appealability of Appraisal Awards

While both arbitration and appraisal are alternative dispute
resolutions designed to discourage litigation, 169 the more limited
nature of appraisals implies that it should be easier for an
aggrieved party to appeal an appraisal award. Arbitration awards
may only be set aside if they are conclusively shown to be the result
Goebel, Inc. v. N. Suburban Agencies, Inc., 567 N.W.2d 511, 515 (Minn. 1997)
(“The cardinal purpose of construing a contract is to give effect to the intention of
the parties as expressed in the language they used in drafting the whole contract.”
(citing Emp’rs Liab. Assurance Corp. v. Morse, 261 Minn. 259, 264, 111 N.W.2d
620, 624 (1961))).
163. See Art Goebel, 567 N.W.2d at 515; Lamb Plumbing & Heating Co. v. KrausAnderson of Minneapolis, Inc., 296 N.W.2d 859, 862 (Minn. 1980); Metro Office
Parks Co. v. Control Data Corp., 295 Minn. 348, 351, 205 N.W.2d 121, 123 (1973).
See generally 2 LEE R. RUSS & THOMAS F. SEGALLA, COUCH ON INSURANCE § 21:14
(3d rev. ed. 2010).
164. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 212 cmt. b (1981) (“Any
determination of meaning or ambiguity should only be made in the light of the
relevant evidence of the situation and relations of the parties, the subject matter of
the transaction, preliminary negotiations and statements . . . , usages of trade, and
the course of dealing between the parties.”).
165. Id. § 202.3, at 86.
166. Id.
167. Quade v. Secura Ins., 814 N.W.2d 703, 706 (Minn. 2012).
168. See generally Frankfurter, supra note 49, at 529–535 (discussing the role of
the judiciary in statutory interpretation). Interpreting legislative intent is not an
opportunity for a judge to use words as “empty vessels into which he can pour
anything he will.” Id. at 529.
169. See supra Part II.B.
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of fraud, corruption, or misconduct; 170 in agreeing to an arbitration
clause, contracting parties agree to assume the risk of an erroneous
outcome. 171 Appraisal findings, on the other hand, may be set aside
for these reasons and where an award is deemed grossly inadequate
or excessive. 172
As previously discussed, and as counseled by the Quade court,
appraisal findings of causation affecting the insured’s coverage are
not final and are subject to judicial review. 173 However, under
Minnesota law parties may contractually stipulate that an appraisal
award be final. 174 This could allow insurance companies to
incorporate clauses regarding the finality of appraisal awards into
their policies, which would directly challenge the common law
trend that favors the insured party. To combat this tactic, an
argument could be made based on the language in Minnesota
Statutes section 65A.01(1) requiring insurance companies to
provide “all the rights and benefits of the Minnesota standard fire
insurance policy”; including a provision that appraisal awards are
final would deny the insured the right to appeal such an award and
contradict the public policy of protecting the interests of the
insured. 175 However, applying the same logic exhibited in the Quade
decision, 176 if the statutory intent of reducing judicial workload
trumps consumer expectations, this is one avenue in which
insurance companies could limit their exposure to litigation and

170. M INN. STAT. § 572B.23 (2012).
171. Park Constr. Co. v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 32, 216 Minn. 27, 33–34,
11 N.W.2d 649, 653 (1943).
172. See Harrington v. Agric. Ins. Co. of Watertown, N.Y., 179 Minn. 510, 511,
229 N.W. 792, 793 (1930).
173. See Mork v. Eureka-Sec. Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 230 Minn. 382, 384,
42 N.W.2d 33, 35 (1950).
174. See Augustine v. Arizant Inc., 735 N.W.2d 740, 745 (Minn. Ct. App. 2007),
rev’d, 751 N.W.2d 95 (Minn. 2008) (“[U]nder Minnesota law, as well as generally,
the result of an appraisal which the parties have thus contracted to have made
is . . . conclusive upon them . . . if they have expressly stipulated that it shall be so
conclusive, or if the intention to be so bound is fairly inferable from the language
which they have used.” (quoting Sanitary Farm Dairies v. Gammel, 195 F.2d 106,
113 (8th Cir. 1952))).
175. M INN. STAT. § 65A.01, subdiv. 1 (stating that coverage against fire and
other perils may be issued without using the verbatim language of the standard
form fire insurance policy, but must still provide all of the rights afforded to
insured under the standard policy). That argument is countered by the assertion
that the legislature’s intent in supplying the appraisal clause is to ensure a
relatively quick and efficient outcome to disputes. See supra Part II.C.
176. See supra Part IV.B.
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make appraisal awards final at the expense of the individual
consumer.
The Quade court acknowledged that the finality of appraisal
findings should depend on (1) the nature of the damage, (2) the
possible causes, (3) the parties’ dispute, and (4) the structure of
the appraisal award. 177 This short list of elements is concerning on
two fronts: (1) the close interrelation of the first two elements, as
exhibited by the dispute in this case; and (2) that it does not
acknowledge the limited requirements as to the qualifications of
appraisers. The first is concerning simply because the first two
elements of the test leave room for the same argument that arose
between Secura and the Quades—the scope of the appraisal
process. 178 The limited requirements regarding the competence of
appraisers is a much more pressing concern because of the
imbalance in resources between large insurance companies and
their insured consumers. 179
2. Clarifying the Elements of the Finality of Appraisals
Given the disagreements between the parties in this case about
the “cause” of and the “amount of loss” of the nature of the
damage done to the three contested roofs, the Quade court could
have clarified the distinction between the first and second elements
of the four-part test stated above. These two elements require a
court to consider the nature of the damage sustained and the
possible causes of the loss. 180 While the district court, the court of
appeals, and the supreme court all characterized the central
dispute of Quade as a disagreement over the phrase “amount of
loss,” the court of appeals also couched the disagreement in terms
of a factual determination over the cause of the damage and
Secura’s liability. 181
In this case there was no dispute that the storm brought about
extensive damage to the farm. 182 The nature of the damage
177. Quade v. Secura Ins., 814 N.W.2d 703, 707–08 (Minn. 2012).
178. See infra Part IV.C(2).
179. See infra Part IV.C(3).
180. See Quade, 814 N.W.2d at 707.
181. Quade v. Secura Ins., 792 N.W.2d 478, 481 (Minn. Ct. App. 2011), rev’d,
814 N.W.2d 703 (Minn. 2012) (“The insureds contend that . . . whether damage
was caused by a covered peril, are inherently questions of coverage . . . . Respondent
insurer takes the position that the damage . . . is not covered because . . . the
policy excludes ‘loss to property caused by . . . maintenance.’” (emphasis added)).
182. See Quade, 814 N.W.2d at 705.
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(physical damage to roofing) could have been caused by either the
storm, inadequate maintenance, or—as is most likely—a
combination of the two. Given that the nature of the damage and
the cause thereof are likely to always be intertwined where the
parties disagree over the amount of relief owed, a better way to
distinguish the individual elements of the test is to express the first
as a question of the risk against which the policy was intended to
protect the insured. Incorporating the risk against which the policy
was meant to protect (wind and fire-related damages) into the
nature of the damage (physical damage to roofing) would better
protect the legal rule that appraisers may not make final
determinations as to liability and make the four-part test for judicial
review more comprehensive.
3. Competence of Appraisers Should Have Been Called into Question
Where the qualifications of the appraisers are concerned, the
language of the appraisal clause has not been amended much since
the legislature enacted Minnesota Statutes section 65.01. 183
The standard policy only goes so far as to state that each appraiser
be “competent and disinterested.” 184 Shortly after the legislature
added the vague requirement of competence to the statute, the
courts found that appraisers did not need to be experts in order to
be considered competent.185 Additionally, the amount of loss set by
the appraisal process is binding. 186 Indeed, even a clerical error on
behalf of an appraiser is not enough to set aside an award. 187
Currently, the law holds that the party attacking the
competence of an appraiser bears the burden of proof of the
appraiser’s incompetence. 188 Because each party bears the cost of
183. Compare M INN. STAT. § 65A.01, subdiv. 3 (2012) (“competent and
disinterested”), with Act of Apr. 25, 1895, ch. 175, § 53, 1895 Minn. Laws 392, 421
(“disinterested”).
184. M INN. STAT. § 65A.01, subdiv. 3.
185. See Am. Cent. Ins. Co. v. Dist. Court, 125 Minn. 374, 379, 147 N.W. 242,
244 (1914) (“It is undoubtedly desirable that those making an appraisal be
familiar with the matters and things which they are called upon to appraise; but,
unless so stipulated in the contract, it has never been held . . . that experts only are
competent as such arbitrators or appraisers.”).
186. See supra, Part II.B.
187. See Bahr v. Union Fire Ins. Co., 167 Minn. 479, 483, 209 N.W. 490, 492
(1926) (“The error in the findings stating the sound value of the property insured
to be $3,000 in the award, instead of $3,500, is so clearly a mere clerical mistake or
inadvertence as to merit no attention.”).
188. Am. Cent. Ins., 125 Minn. at 377, 147 N.W. at 243.
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the appraiser they select, 189 this could work against the public policy
that favors insured parties in Minnesota. Insurance companies are
likely to be in a better position to hire an expert appraiser, and are
also in a better position to attack the qualifications of the insured’s
appraiser.
If appraisers need not be experts in the property or the type of
damage they are asked to evaluate, their determinations of
causation should also be suspect, especially as causation relates to
the application of the policy. Prior to 2010, there had been no
Minnesota case law to determine whether appraisals for valuation
may consider the underlying liability of a damage-causing event. 190
With the recent rapid increase of property insurance claims due to
weather-related causes, courts throughout the country have been
asked to address the nature, scope, and purpose of appraisals. 191
Several states have addressed the question of whether appraisers
should be allowed to determine causation, 192 but the Quade decision
creates a very expansive view of the scope of appraisal. Placing
more responsibility in the hands of non-judicial appraisers should
be accompanied by guidelines as to the qualifications or
competence of these important individuals.
D. Contravening Public Policy by Compelling Appraisal as Condition
Precedent
While the majority logically reasoned that appraisers must
determine causative factors, the ruling that appraisal is a condition
precedent to litigation should be construed narrowly. Given that
189. M INN. STAT. § 65A.01, subdiv. 3 (“Each appraiser shall be paid by the
selecting party, or the party for whom selected, and the expense of the appraisal
and umpire shall be paid by the parties equally.”).
190. See QBE Ins. Corp. v. Twin Homes of French Ridge Homeowners Ass’n,
778 N.W.2d 393, 399 (Minn. Ct. App. 2010).
191. Heres, et al., supra note 45, at 5.
192. See, e.g., St. Charles Parish Hosp. Serv. Dist. No. 1 v. United Fire & Cas.
Co., 681 F. Supp. 2d 748, 757 (E.D. La. 2010) (“[T]he plain language of the policy
requires the appraisers to determine the ‘amount of the loss.’”); CIGNA Ins. Co. v.
Didimoi Prop. Holdings, N.V., 110 F. Supp. 2d 259, 268 (D. Del. 2000) (“[A]
determination of amount of loss under the appraisal clause includes a
determination of causation.”); State Farm Lloyds v. Johnson, 290 S.W.3d 886,
892–93 (Tex. 2009) (stating that because causation is the connection between
liability and damages, appraisers must always consider causation). But see Munn v.
Nat’l Fire Ins. Co. of Hartford, 115 So. 2d 54, 58 (Miss. 1959) (holding that the
question of causation of damaged walls “was not a question for the appraisers to
decide”).
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disagreements regarding liability may ultimately be decided in
favor of the insured party and thereafter the amount owed will be a
necessary fact, the presumption that an appraisal to determine the
“amount of loss” will be needed in the majority of liability disputes
reaching the courtroom 193 is a sound supposition. However,
“[a]ppraisal should not be a sideshow in a coverage litigation, but
an alternative dispute resolution process designed to quickly and
inexpensively determine the amount of loss when that is the dispute
among the parties.” 194
Generally speaking, a court’s review of an appraisal award is
grounded in contract interpretation.195 The judicial scope of review
in these cases is limited to fraud, corruption, or misconduct
resulting in an unjust result or instances where the appraisers have
overstepped their authority. 196 This means that courts would not
review the third-party experts’ analysis of the amount or causation
of a loss, but whether those experts complied with the terms of
their contractual obligation. 197 This would allow an appraisal to
stand where appraisers made an honest mistake in judgment;
absent a showing of fraud, corruption, or misconduct, a mistake as
to the cause of loss could leave an insured party with no legal
remedy.
On the other hand, the time and expense of appraisal would
be a worthless endeavor for both parties if a court later rules the
entire loss to be excluded by the policy. 198 In this case, Secura
issued payment for part of the Quades’ single claim and rejected
193. Quade v. Secura Ins., 814 N.W.2d 703, 708 (Minn. 2012).
194. Law & Starinovich, supra note 39, at 306 (emphasis added).
195. See COHEN ET AL ., supra note 42, § 47.06(3); Law & Starinovich, supra note
39, at 310.
196. See Mork v. Eureka-Sec. Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 230 Minn. 382, 391,
42 N.W.2d 33, 38 (1950) (“An award in arbitration . . . . will not be vacated unless
it clearly appears that it was the result of fraud or because of some misfeasance or
malfeasance or wrongdoing on the part of the appraisers.”); Baldinger v. Camden
Fire Ins. Ass’n, 121 Minn. 160, 162, 141 N.W. 104, 105 (1913) (stating that
appraisal awards may not be invalidated for mere inadequacy); QBE Ins. Corp. v.
Twin Homes of French Ridge Homeowners Ass’n, 778 N.W.2d 393, 398 (Minn. Ct.
App. 2010) (applying arbitration statute to appraisals to show an appraisal award
may be appealed if appraisers exceed their contractual powers); see also Parker,
supra note 41, at 946 (“Judicial review of an appraisal award is generally limited in
scope to fraud, corruption or misconduct that caused an unjust result. However,
courts may also review an appraisal award on the basis of the scope of the
appraiser’s authority and whether she has exceeded it.”).
197. Parker, supra note 41, at 946.
198. See Law & Starinovich, supra note 39, at 296–97.
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coverage for three structures. 199 The primary dispute between the
parties was the extent of the damage for which Secura should
pay. 200 While the distinction smacks of technicality, it is sound
policy to draw the proverbial line in the sand between a case where
the insurer denies a claim in its entirety and where the insurer pays
a portion of the claim and rejects the rest in good faith. 201 This
division would encourage insurers to admit liability, pay at least a
portion of the claim, and initiate the appraisal process.
Enforcing a standard process that upholds the policy goals
underlying insurance appraisal is critical to prevent further
unnecessary litigation. Public policy favors the interests of the
insured party in the context of insurance contracts. 202 If an insured
plaintiff attacks an appraisal award for insufficiency, she bears the
burden of proof. 203 However, in litigation, the burden of proof is
shifted to the insurer to show application of an exclusion clause. 204
Public policy 205 favors the latter—in most cases, the insurance
provider is in a better position to prove the cause is excluded than
an insured party is to invalidate a third-party expert’s
determination of causation. Indeed, even courts are loath to
disturb factual findings of appraisers. 206 This is especially worrisome
given the fact that appraisers need not be regarded as experts in
order to be compliant with the statutory requirements of

199. Quade v. Secura Ins., 814 N.W.2d 703, 704 (Minn. 2012).
200. Id. at 706.
201. Id. at 708 (Page, J., dissenting) (citing judicial economy as enough
reason to require a legal determination of coverage prior to appraisal); see also
Law & Starinovich, supra note 39, at 309 (“When a dispute is strictly over coverage,
appraisal is unnecessary.”).
202. See supra Part IV.A; see also 5 LON A. BERK & M ICHAEL S. LEVINE , APPLEMAN
ON INSURANCE § 48.03(2) (2013), available at LEXIS NEWAPL (“Consumers have
an interest in having their disputes with insurers resolved through judicial
proceedings where a jury can resolve issues of fact and where bad faith exposure
may operate as a genuine disincentive to insurer misconduct.”).
203. Parker, supra note 41, at 937. Similarly, the insured also bears the burden
of proof if they wish to challenge the competency of the insurance company’s
appraiser. See supra note 188 and accompanying text.
204. Henning Nelson Constr. Co. v. Fireman’s Fund Am. Life Ins. Co.,
383 N.W.2d 645, 652 (Minn. 1986) (citing Caledonia Cnty. Hosp. v. St. Paul Fire &
Marine Ins. Co., 307 Minn. 352, 354, 239 N.W.2d 768, 770 (1976)).
205. For a brief synopsis of public policy considerations under Minnesota
insurance law, see WEIMER ET AL ., supra note 64, § 2:6.
206. See supra note 186 and accompanying text; see also Law & Starinovoch,
supra note 39, at 308 (“[A]ppraisal places great reliance upon expert appraisers
who may be best positioned to determine the amount of loss.”).
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competency. 207 For the foregoing reasons, appraisals should be
considered a condition precedent only under the condition that
the insurance provider has not flatly refused liability for an entire
claim.
V. CONCLUSION
The Quade court directly addressed the question of whether
insurance appraisers are allowed to consider the causation of
liability underlying a damage-causing event, 208 finding that
appraisers must consider causation, but that final determinations of
liability are reserved for the court. 209 The holding that appraisal is a
condition precedent to litigation sets a standard expectation for
parties involved in disputes as to the amount of loss following
property damage. 210 However, while the court correctly interpreted
“amount of loss” to unambiguously allow appraisers to consider
factors of causation, the precedent the court sets for appraisal as a
condition precedent to litigation should not be applied in all
disputes.
This case highlights contradictory goals of two public policies
concerning insurance appraisals—one that favors judicial
expediency for the benefit of society as a whole, and one that favors
the interests of the individual insured party. Recognizing that the
time and expense of the appraisal process is an unnecessary burden
on both parties if a court later invalidates the appraisal award, and
litigation is an unnecessary expense to society if court proceedings
are initiated and then stalled for an appraisal, the law should
provide a clear distinction for when a dispute should proceed to
appraisal and when it should go to litigation. Additionally, under
the current state of legislation and case law, there are no standard
qualifications for the level of expertise expected of appraisers.
Given that insurance providers are better situated to identify or
attack the qualifications of experts, courts should review appraisers’
credentials when making determinations as to the finality of
appraisal awards. In order to achieve an appropriate balance
between societal and individual interests, appraisals should be a
condition precedent where the insurance provider has admitted
207.
208.
209.
210.

See supra note 185 and accompanying text.
See supra note 190 and accompanying text.
Quade v. Secura Ins., 814 N.W.2d 703, 708 (Minn. 2012).
Id.
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liability and the dispute between the parties is the amount to be
paid, but not where an insurance provider has denied coverage of
an entire claim.
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